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Monthly Archives: September 2015

5 Legal Technology Experts on the Biggest Trends to Watch

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Chris DiMarco
09/17/2015

The news and trends driving the legal technology space evolve quickly, and, as a result, keeping abreast of the latest developments can be a difficult prospect. A single case, technological advancement or cresting trend has the capacity to disrupt not only the way law is practiced, but also the effectiveness of tools developed to support it. While predicting the next big shake-up is a bit of a guessing game, no group is better prepared to give context to the space than the attorneys, vendors and analysts that live at the crossroads of technology and law.
Legaltech News’ Technology Digest brings together the voices of these professionals, offering an uneditorialized view into their top-of-mind thoughts and concerns. Our goal is to give deeper context to the industry, coloring our original content with the (sometimes conflicting) voices of those with boots on the ground.

1. Greater Security and Productivity Go Hand-in-Hand
“Most law firms handle a staggering volume of documents every day – many of which contain confidential information related to a client matter or legal case. With the threat of cyber security breaches becoming only more serious and the penalties for non-compliance with security mandates more severe, organizations must gain control of their document workflows to prevent data leaks and the consequential damaged credibility and hefty fines. But strengthening security does not necessarily have to result in extra work for your employees; all technology you employ should work in harmony and enhance, not hinder, productivity. Security should be built into existing workflows, allowing employees to seamlessly access and share information according to company policy. Document management systems and managed print services, for example, integrate legal workflows to help firms streamline processes and increase productivity without the risk of flawed security. When workflows work well, your employees work better. “
—Chris Strammiello, vice president of global alliances & strategic marketing, Nuance Communications

2. E-Discovery on Demand
“As more corporations and law firms internalize their electronic discovery operations, they often seek a more flexible solution for hardware and software. Legal professionals like the control that self-service brings, but they do not want to invest in hardware, software or IT infrastructure. They do not want to worry about many of the issues that IT teams deal with – software upgrades, backups and security – but they do want to have access to state-of-the-art technology when they need it. All that is feeding the on-demand e-discovery trend, also known as managed services. Under such a model, law firms and corporations are able to scale up as necessary and pay for what they use without investing in a complete infrastructure. In fact, there are two separate models in play. Platform-as-a-service is hosted on behalf of a law firm or service provider as a dedicated environment for each client. Software-as-a-service is a hosted, shared environment that enables self-service e-discovery, with no hardware or IT support necessary and limited administration access. Either model allows corporations and law firms to take control of discovery quickly without a large upfront investment.”
—Arestotle Thapa, CEO, Venio Systems

3. The Financial Crisis’ Impact on the Legal Industry
“The financial crisis of 2008 significantly changed how legal services are managed by Corporate America, and it will not change back to how it had been. Before 2008, legal departments were more willing to be hands off in their management of their outside counsel. Now, legal departments are actively involved and interested in the ways in which legal services are packaged and delivered. Law firms who are better able to tailor their services to deliver value as newly defined by their clients will be at an advantage over those who cannot or will not. What law firms ought to focus on to differentiate themselves and be better attuned to the new value proposition is an integrated approach to their matters focusing on effective budgeting, case management and efficiency while balancing cost, risk and value in their clients’ interests. Law firms can do this through technology, training and education, but unless they ensure their attorneys are bought in, there is no technology or training that will do it for them.”
—Steve Berrent, president and CEO, eMag Solutions

4. Owning Legal Technology
“An important new role has been added to IT departments: ownership of legal technology and processes, along with the responsibility for legal liability in an IT context. Too few organizations hold regular conversations addressing the intersection of IT and legal. GCs need to partner with IT before a security incident occurs to identify specific risks and collaborate on appropriate processes and technology strategies that will effectively mitigate company liability. Legal departments need to be constantly aware of IT operations and infrastructure in order to identify potential blind spots that create risk to the organization. GCs should be engaged in any discussions regarding company-wide technology planning and procurement initiatives. For their part, CIOs need to thoroughly understand the legal implication of a cyber-breach and position the GC to mitigate. By encouraging dialogue and process creation, organizations can cultivate an environment that fosters purposeful collaboration between legal and IT to efficiently mitigate, respond and re-mediate risks.”
—Dave Deppe, president, UnitedLex Corporation

5. Technology Planning for M&A Compliance
“The first half of 2015 has seen the most M&A activity since 2007, a trend likely to continue through year-end. For a deal subject to the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act that elicits extended review, responding to a request for additional information, commonly called a second request, can be considerably more challenging than in the past, given the exponentially growing amount of information in corporations today. The emphasis on rapid response and substantial compliance requires a well-thought, seamless game plan and a team including counsel and a discovery provider with extensive second request experience. Critical factors in the plan include communication and project management guiding workflow processes that are supported by the appropriate technology. The right team using all the available tools can nimbly and effectively get the deal across the goal line.”
http://m.legaltechnews.com/module/alm/app/ltn.do#!/article/1754210619

 
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Posted by on September 19, 2015 in Investigations

 

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Online-Dating Extortion Scams Exposed – http://wp.me/psc8g-9P

 
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Posted by on September 19, 2015 in Investigations

 

CRIMINAL STALKING LAWS, MISSOURI

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Missouri
This page lists the most applicable state crimes addressing stalking. However, depending on the facts of the case, a stalker might also be charged with other crimes, such as trespassing, intimidation of a witness, breaking and entering, etc. Check your state code or consult with your local prosecutor about other charges that might apply in a particular case.

Stalking
§ 565.225. Crime of stalking — definitions – penalties
Analyzing Stalking Laws

Stalking

R.S.Mo. § 565.225. Crime of stalking — definitions – penalties. (2008)
1. As used in this section, the following terms shall mean:

(1)  “Course of conduct”, a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts, which may include communication by any means, over a period of time, however short, evidencing a continuity of purpose. Constitutionally protected activity is not included within the meaning of course of conduct. Such constitutionally protected activity includes picketing or other organized protests;

(2)  “Credible threat”, a threat communicated with the intent to cause the person who is the target of the threat to reasonably fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her family, or household members or domestic animals or livestock as defined in section 276.606, RSMo, kept at such person’s residence or on such person’s property. The threat must be against the life of, or a threat to cause physical injury to, or the kidnapping of, the person, the person’s family, or the person’s household members or domestic animals or livestock as defined in section 276.606, RSMo, kept at such person’s residence or on such person’s property;

(3)  “Harasses”, to engage in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that serves no legitimate purpose, that would cause a reasonable person under the circumstances to be frightened, intimidated, or emotionally distressed.

2. A person commits the crime of stalking if he or she purposely, through his or her course of conduct, harasses or follows with the intent of harassing another person.

3. A person commits the crime of aggravated stalking if he or she purposely, through his or her course of conduct, harasses or follows with the intent of harassing another person, and:

(1)  Makes a credible threat; or

(2)  At least one of the acts constituting the course of conduct is in violation of an order of protection and the person has received actual notice of such order; or

(3)  At least one of the actions constituting the course of conduct is in violation of a condition of probation, parole, pretrial release, or release on bond pending appeal; or

(4)  At any time during the course of conduct, the other person is seventeen years of age or younger and the person harassing the other person is twenty-one years of age or older; or

(5)  He or she has previously pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of domestic assault, violation of an order of protection, or any other crime where the other person was the victim.

4. The crime of stalking shall be a class A misdemeanor unless the person has previously pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of a violation of this section, or of any offense committed in violation of any county or municipal ordinance in any state, any state law, any federal law, or any military law which, if committed in this state, would be chargeable or indictable as a violation of any offense listed in this section, in which case stalking shall be a class D felony.

5. The crime of aggravated stalking shall be a class D felony unless the person has previously pleaded guilty to or been found guilty of a violation of this section, or of any offense committed in violation of any county or municipal ordinance in any state, any state law, any federal law, or any military law which, if committed in this state, would be chargeable or indictable as a violation of any offense listed in this section, aggravated stalking shall be a class C felony.

6. Any law enforcement officer may arrest, without a warrant, any person he or she has probable cause to believe has violated the provisions of this section.

7. This section shall not apply to activities of federal, state, county, or municipal law enforcement officers conducting investigations of violation of federal, state, county, or municipal law.

 
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Posted by on September 18, 2015 in Investigations

 

CRIMINAL STALKING LAWS, ILLINOIS

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Illinois
This page lists the most applicable state crimes addressing stalking. However, depending on the facts of the case, a stalker might also be charged with other crimes, such as trespassing, intimidation of a witness, breaking and entering, etc. Check your state code or consult with your local prosecutor about other charges that might apply in a particular case.

Stalking

720 ILCS 5/12-7.3. Stalking
720 ILCS 5/12-7.4. Aggravated stalking
720 ILCS 5/12-7.5. Cyberstalking
Also See: Illinois Stalking Order of Protection

Analyzing Stalking Laws

Stalking

720 ILCS 5/12-7.3. Stalking. (2011)
(a) A person commits stalking when he or she knowingly engages in a course of conduct directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that this course of conduct would cause a reasonable person to:

(1) fear for his or her safety or the safety of a third person; or

(2) suffer other emotional distress.

(a-3) A person commits stalking when he or she, knowingly and without lawful justification, on at least 2 separate occasions follows another person or places the person under surveillance or any combination thereof and:

(1) at any time transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint and the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person; or

(2) places that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint to or of that person or a family member of that person.

(a-5) A person commits stalking when he or she has previously been convicted of stalking another person and knowingly and without lawful justification on one occasion:

(1) follows that same person or places that same person under surveillance; and

(2) transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement or restraint to that person or a family member of that person.

(b) Sentence. Stalking is a Class 4 felony. A second or subsequent conviction for stalking is a Class 3 felony.

(c) Definitions. For purposes of this Section:

(1) “Course of conduct” means 2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which a defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about, a person, engages in other non-consensual contact, or interferes with or damages a person’s property or pet. A course of conduct may include contact via electronic communications.

(2) “Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writings, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system. “Electronic communication” includes transmissions by a computer through the Internet to another computer.

(3) “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm.

(4) “Family member” means a parent, grandparent, brother, sister, or child, whether by whole blood, half-blood, or adoption and includes a step-grandparent, step-parent, step-brother, step-sister or step-child. “Family member” also means any other person who regularly resides in the household, or who, within the prior 6 months, regularly resided in the household.

(5) “Follows another person” means (i) to move in relative proximity to a person as that person moves from place to place or (ii) to remain in relative proximity to a person who is stationary or whose movements are confined to a small area. “Follows another person” does not include a following within the residence of the defendant.

(6) “Non-consensual contact” means any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; or placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim.

(7) “Places a person under surveillance” means: (1) remaining present outside the person’s school, place of employment, vehicle, other place occupied by the person, or residence other than the residence of the defendant; or (2) placing an electronic tracking device on the person or the person’s property.

(8) “Reasonable person” means a person in the victim’s situation.

(9) “Transmits a threat” means a verbal or written threat or a threat implied by a pattern of conduct or a combination of verbal or written statements or conduct.

(d) Exemptions.

(1) This Section does not apply to any individual or organization (i) monitoring or attentive to compliance with public or worker safety laws, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements, or (ii) picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute, including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the making or maintaining of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.

(2) This Section does not apply to an exercise of the right to free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful.

(3) Telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile service providers, and providers of information services, including, but not limited to, Internet service providers and hosting service providers, are not liable under this Section, except for willful and wanton misconduct, by virtue of the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or by virtue of the provision of other related telecommunications, commercial mobile services, or information services used by others in violation of this Section.

(d-5) The incarceration of a person in a penal institution who commits the course of conduct or transmits a threat is not a bar to prosecution under this Section.

(d-10) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

720 ILCS 5/12-7.4. Aggravated stalking. (2011)
(a) A person commits aggravated stalking when he or she, in conjunction with committing the offense of stalking, also does any of the following:

(1) causes bodily harm to the victim;

(2) confines or restrains the victim; or

(3) violates a temporary restraining order, an order of protection, a stalking no contact order, a civil no contact order, or an injunction prohibiting the behavior described in subsection (b)(1) of Section 214 of the Illinois Domestic Violence Act of 1986 [750 ILCS 60/214].

(a-1) A person commits aggravated stalking when he or she is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act [730 ILCS 150/1 et seq.] or has been previously required to register under that Act and commits the offense of stalking when the victim of the stalking is also the victim of the offense for which the sex offender is required to register under the Sex Offender Registration Act or a family member of the victim.

(b) Sentence. Aggravated stalking is a Class 3 felony. A second or subsequent conviction for aggravated stalking is a Class 2 felony.

(c) Exemptions.

(1) This Section does not apply to any individual or organization (i) monitoring or attentive to compliance with public or worker safety laws, wage and hour requirements, or other statutory requirements, or (ii) picketing occurring at the workplace that is otherwise lawful and arises out of a bona fide labor dispute including any controversy concerning wages, salaries, hours, working conditions or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave, insurance, and pension or retirement provisions, the managing or maintenance of collective bargaining agreements, and the terms to be included in those agreements.

(2) This Section does not apply to an exercise of the right of free speech or assembly that is otherwise lawful.

(3) Telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile service providers, and providers of information services, including, but not limited to, Internet service providers and hosting service providers, are not liable under this Section, except for willful and wanton misconduct, by virtue of the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or by virtue of the provision of other related telecommunications, commercial mobile services, or information services used by others in violation of this Section.

(d) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

720 ILCS 5/12-7.5. Cyberstalking. (2011)
(a) A person commits cyberstalking when he or she engages in a course of conduct using electronic communication directed at a specific person, and he or she knows or should know that would cause a reasonable person to:

(1) fear for his or her safety or the safety of a third person; or

(2) suffer other emotional distress.

(a-3) A person commits cyberstalking when he or she, knowingly and without lawful justification, on at least 2 separate occasions, harasses another person through the use of electronic communication and:

(1) at any time transmits a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint and the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person, or

(2) places that person or a family member of that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint; or

(3) at any time knowingly solicits the commission of an act by any person which would be a violation of this Code directed towards that person or a family member of that person.

(a-5) A person commits cyberstalking when he or she, knowingly and without lawful justification, creates and maintains an Internet website or webpage which is accessible to one or more third parties for a period of at least 24 hours, and which contains statements harassing another person and:

(1) which communicates a threat of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint, where the threat is directed towards that person or a family member of that person, or

(2) which places that person or a family member of that person in reasonable apprehension of immediate or future bodily harm, sexual assault, confinement, or restraint, or

(3) which knowingly solicits the commission of an act by any person which would be a violation of this Code directed towards that person or a family member of that person.

(b) Sentence. Cyberstalking is a Class 4 felony. A second or subsequent conviction for cyberstalking is a Class 3 felony.

(c) For purposes of this Section:

(1) “Course of conduct” means 2 or more acts, including but not limited to acts in which a defendant directly, indirectly, or through third parties, by any action, method, device, or means follows, monitors, observes, surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about, a person, engages in other non-consensual contact, or interferes with or damages a person’s property or pet. The incarceration in a penal institution of a person who commits the course of conduct is not a bar to prosecution under this Section.

(2) “Electronic communication” means any transfer of signs, signals, writings, sounds, data, or intelligence of any nature transmitted in whole or in part by a wire, radio, electromagnetic, photoelectric, or photo-optical system. “Electronic communication” includes transmissions by a computer through the Internet to another computer.

(3) “Emotional distress” means significant mental suffering, anxiety or alarm.

(4) “Harass” means to engage in a knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person that alarms, torments, or terrorizes that person.

(5) “Non-consensual contact” means any contact with the victim that is initiated or continued without the victim’s consent, including but not limited to being in the physical presence of the victim; appearing within the sight of the victim; approaching or confronting the victim in a public place or on private property; appearing at the workplace or residence of the victim; entering onto or remaining on property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim; or placing an object on, or delivering an object to, property owned, leased, or occupied by the victim.

(6) “Reasonable person” means a person in the victim’s circumstances, with the victim’s knowledge of the defendant and the defendant’s prior acts.

(7) “Third party” means any person other than the person violating these provisions and the person or persons towards whom the violator’s actions are directed.

(d) Telecommunications carriers, commercial mobile service providers, and providers of information services, including, but not limited to, Internet service providers and hosting service providers, are not liable under this Section, except for willful and wanton misconduct, by virtue of the transmission, storage, or caching of electronic communications or messages of others or by virtue of the provision of other related telecommunications, commercial mobile services, or information services used by others in violation of this Section.

(e) A defendant who directed the actions of a third party violate this Section, under the principles of accountability set forth in Article 5 of this Code, is guilty of violating this Section as if the same had been personally done by the defendant, without regard to the mental state of the third party acting at the direction of the defendant.

 
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Posted by on September 18, 2015 in Investigations

 

U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets | We Are Change

U.S. SUPREME COURT AND OTHER HIGH COURT CITATIONS PROVING THAT NO LICENSE IS NECESSARY FOR NORMAL USE OF AN AUTOMOBILE ON COMMON WAYS
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“The right of a citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, by horsedrawn carriage, wagon, or automobile, is not a mere privilege which may be permitted or prohibited at will, but a common right which he has under his right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. Under this constitutional guaranty one may, therefore, under normal conditions, travel at his inclination along the public highways or in public places, and while conducting himself in an orderly and decent manner, neither interfering with nor disturbing another’s rights, he will be protected, not only in his person, but in his safe conduct.”
Thompson v.Smith, 154 SE 579, 11 American Jurisprudence, Constitutional Law, section 329, page 1135 “The right of the Citizen to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon, in the ordinary course of life and business, is a common right which he has under the right to enjoy life and liberty, to acquire and possess property, and to pursue happiness and safety. It includes the right, in so doing, to use the ordinary and usual conveyances of the day, and under the existing modes of travel, includes the right to drive a horse drawn carriage or wagon thereon or to operate an automobile thereon, for the usual and ordinary purpose of life and business.” –
Thompson vs. Smith, supra.; Teche Lines vs. Danforth, Miss., 12 S.2d 784 “… the right of the citizen to drive on a public street with freedom from police interference… is a fundamental constitutional right” -White, 97 Cal.App.3d.141, 158 Cal.Rptr. 562, 566-67 (1979) “citizens have a right to drive upon the public streets of the District of Columbia or any other city absent a constitutionally sound reason for limiting their access.”
Caneisha Mills v. D.C. 2009 “The use of the automobile as a necessary adjunct to the earning of a livelihood in modern life requires us in the interest of realism to conclude that the RIGHT to use an automobile on the public highways partakes of the nature of a liberty within the meaning of the Constitutional guarantees. . .”
Berberian v. Lussier (1958) 139 A2d 869, 872, See also: Schecter v. Killingsworth, 380 P.2d 136, 140; 93 Ariz. 273 (1963). “The right to operate a motor vehicle [an automobile] upon the public streets and highways is not a mere privilege. It is a right of liberty, the enjoyment of which is protected by the guarantees of the federal and state constitutions.”
Adams v. City of Pocatello, 416 P.2d 46, 48; 91 Idaho 99 (1966). “A traveler has an equal right to employ an automobile as a means of transportation and to occupy the public highways with other vehicles in common use.”
Campbell v. Walker, 78 Atl. 601, 603, 2 Boyce (Del.) 41. “The owner of an automobile has the same right as the owner of other vehicles to use the highway,* * * A traveler on foot has the same right to the use of the public highways as an automobile or any other vehicle.”
Simeone v. Lindsay, 65 Atl. 778, 779; Hannigan v. Wright, 63 Atl. 234, 236. “The RIGHT of the citizen to DRIVE on the public street with freedom from police interference, unless he is engaged in suspicious conduct associated in some manner with criminality is a FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT which must be protected by the courts.” People v. Horton 14 Cal. App. 3rd 667 (1971) “The right to make use of an automobile as a vehicle of travel long the highways of the state, is no longer an open question. The owners thereof have the same rights in the roads and streets as the drivers of horses or those riding a bicycle or traveling in some other vehicle.”
House v. Cramer, 112 N.W. 3; 134 Iowa 374; Farnsworth v. Tampa Electric Co. 57 So. 233, 237, 62 Fla. 166. “The automobile may be used with safety to others users of the highway, and in its proper use upon the highways there is an equal right with the users of other vehicles properly upon the highways. The law recognizes such right of use upon general principles.
Brinkman v Pacholike, 84 N.E. 762, 764, 41 Ind. App. 662, 666. “The law does not denounce motor carriages, as such, on public ways. They have an equal right with other vehicles in common use to occupy the streets and roads. It is improper to say that the driver of the horse has rights in the roads superior to the driver of the automobile. Both have the right to use the easement.”
Indiana Springs Co. v. Brown, 165 Ind. 465, 468. U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 2 2 “A highway is a public way open and free to any one who has occasion to pass along it on foot or with any kind of vehicle.” Schlesinger v. City of Atlanta, 129 S.E. 861, 867, 161 Ga. 148, 159;
Holland v. Shackelford, 137 S.E. 2d 298, 304, 220 Ga. 104; Stavola v. Palmer, 73 A.2d 831, 838, 136 Conn. 670 “There can be no question of the right of automobile owners to occupy and use the public streets of cities, or highways in the rural districts.” Liebrecht v. Crandall, 126 N.W. 69, 110 Minn. 454, 456 “The word ‘automobile’ connotes a pleasure vehicle designed for the transportation of persons on highways.”
-American Mutual Liability Ins. Co., vs. Chaput, 60 A.2d 118, 120; 95 NH 200 Motor Vehicle: 18 USC Part 1 Chapter 2 section 31 definitions: “(6) Motor vehicle. – The term “motor vehicle” means every description of carriage or other contrivance propelled or drawn by mechanical power and used for commercial purposes on the highways…” 10) The term “used for commercial purposes” means the carriage of persons or property for any fare, fee, rate, charge or other consideration, or directly or indirectly in connection with any business, or other undertaking intended for profit. “A motor vehicle or automobile for hire is a motor vehicle, other than an automobile stage, used for the transportation of persons for which remuneration is received.”
-International Motor Transit Co. vs. Seattle, 251 P. 120 The term ‘motor vehicle’ is different and broader than the word ‘automobile.’”
-City of Dayton vs. DeBrosse, 23 NE.2d 647, 650; 62 Ohio App. 232 “Thus self-driven vehicles are classified according to the use to which they are put rather than according to the means by which they are propelled” – Ex Parte Hoffert, 148 NW 20 ”
The Supreme Court, in Arthur v. Morgan, 112 U.S. 495, 5 S.Ct. 241, 28 L.Ed. 825, held that carriages were properly classified as household effects, and we see no reason that automobiles should not be similarly disposed of.”
Hillhouse v United States, 152 F. 163, 164 (2nd Cir. 1907). “…a citizen has the right to travel upon the public highways and to transport his property thereon…” State vs. Johnson, 243 P. 1073; Cummins vs. Homes, 155 P. 171; Packard vs. Banton, 44 S.Ct. 256; Hadfield vs. Lundin, 98 Wash 516, Willis vs. Buck, 263 P. l 982;
Barney vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, 17 P.2d 82 “The use of the highways for the purpose of travel and transportation is not a mere privilege, but a common and fundamental Right of which the public and the individual cannot be rightfully deprived.”
Chicago Motor Coach vs. Chicago, 169 NE 22; Ligare vs. Chicago, 28 NE 934; Boon vs. Clark, 214 SSW 607; 25 Am.Jur. (1st) Highways Sect.163 “the right of the Citizen to travel upon the highway and to transport his property thereon in the ordinary course of life and business… is the usual and ordinary right of the Citizen, a right common to all.” –
Ex Parte Dickey, (Dickey vs. Davis), 85 SE 781 “Every Citizen has an unalienable RIGHT to make use of the public highways of the state; every Citizen has full freedom to travel from place to place in the enjoyment of life and liberty.” People v. Nothaus, 147 Colo. 210. “No State government entity has the power to allow or deny passage on the highways, byways, nor waterways… transporting his vehicles and personal property for either recreation or business, but by being subject only to local regulation i.e., safety, caution, traffic lights, speed limits, etc. Travel is not a privilege requiring licensing, vehicle registration, or forced insurances.”
Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 169 N.E. 22. “Traffic infractions are not a crime.” People v. Battle “Persons faced with an unconstitutional licensing law which purports to require a license as a prerequisite to exercise of right… may ignore the law and engage with impunity in exercise of such right.”
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 3 “The word ‘operator’ shall not include any person who solely transports his own property and who transports no persons or property for hire or compensation.”
Statutes at Large California Chapter 412 p.83 “Highways are for the use of the traveling public, and all have the right to use them in a reasonable and proper manner; the use thereof is an inalienable right of every citizen.” Escobedo v. State 35 C2d 870 in 8 Cal Jur 3d p.27 “RIGHT — A legal RIGHT, a constitutional RIGHT means a RIGHT protected by the law, by the constitution, but government does not create the idea of RIGHT or original RIGHTS; it acknowledges them. . . “ Bouvier’s Law Dictionary, 1914, p. 2961. “Those who have the right to do something cannot be licensed for what they already have right to do as such license would be meaningless.”
City of Chicago v Collins 51 NE 907, 910. “A license means leave to do a thing which the licensor could prevent.” Blatz Brewing Co. v. Collins, 160 P.2d 37, 39; 69 Cal. A. 2d 639. “The object of a license is to confer a right or power, which does not exist without it.”
Payne v. Massey (19__) 196 SW 2nd 493, 145 Tex 273. “The court makes it clear that a license relates to qualifications to engage in profession, business, trade or calling; thus, when merely traveling without compensation or profit, outside of business enterprise or adventure with the corporate state, no license is required of the natural individual traveling for personal business, pleasure and transportation.”
Wingfield v. Fielder 2d Ca. 3d 213 (1972). “If [state] officials construe a vague statute unconstitutionally, the citizen may take them at their word, and act on the assumption that the statute is void.” –
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham 394 U.S. 147 (1969). “With regard particularly to the U.S. Constitution, it is elementary that a Right secured or protected by that document cannot be overthrown or impaired by any state police authority.” Donnolly vs. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 US 540; Lafarier vs. Grand Trunk R.R. Co., 24 A. 848; O’Neil vs. Providence Amusement Co., 108 A. 887. “The right to travel (called the right of free ingress to other states, and egress from them) is so fundamental that it appears in the Articles of Confederation, which governed our society before the Constitution.”
(Paul v. Virginia). “[T]he right to travel freely from State to State … is a right broadly assertable against private interference as well as governmental action. Like the right of association, it is a virtually unconditional personal right, guaranteed by the Constitution to us all.” (U.S. Supreme Court,
Shapiro v. Thompson). EDGERTON, Chief Judge: “Iron curtains have no place in a free world. …’Undoubtedly the right of locomotion, the right to remove from one place to another according to inclination, is an attribute of personal liberty, and the right, ordinarily, of free transit from or through the territory of any State is a right secured by the Constitution.’
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274, 21 S.Ct. 128, 45 L.Ed. 186. “Our nation has thrived on the principle that, outside areas of plainly harmful conduct, every American is left to shape his own life as he thinks best, do what he pleases, go where he pleases.” Id., at 197.
Kent vs. Dulles see Vestal, Freedom of Movement, 41 Iowa L.Rev. 6, 13—14. “The validity of restrictions on the freedom of movement of particular individuals, both substantively and procedurally, is precisely the sort of matter that is the peculiar domain of the courts.” Comment, 61 Yale L.J. at page 187. “a person detained for an investigatory stop can be questioned but is “not obliged to answer, answers may not be compelled, and refusal to answer furnishes no basis for an arrest.”Justice White, Hiibel “Automobiles have the right to use the highways of the State on an equal footing with other vehicles.”
Cumberland Telephone. & Telegraph Co. v Yeiser 141 Kentucy 15. “Each citizen has the absolute right to choose for himself the mode of conveyance he desires, whether it be by wagon or carriage, by horse, motor or electric car, or by bicycle, or astride of a horse, subject to the sole condition that he will observe all those requirements that are known as the law of the road.”
Swift v City of Topeka, 43 U.S. Supreme Court says No License Necessary To Drive Automobile On Public Highways/Streets No License Is Necessary Copy and Share Freely YHVH.name 4 Kansas 671, 674. The Supreme Court said in U.S. v Mersky (1960) 361 U.S. 431: An administrative regulation, of course, is not a “statute.” A traveler on foot has the same right to use of the public highway as an automobile or any other vehicle.
Cecchi v. Lindsay, 75 Atl. 376, 377, 1 Boyce (Del.) 185. Automotive vehicles are lawful means of conveyance and have equal rights upon the streets with horses and carriages.
Chicago Coach Co. v. City of Chicago, 337 Ill. 200, 205; See also: Christy v. Elliot, 216 Ill. 31; Ward v. Meredith, 202 Ill. 66; Shinkle v. McCullough, 116 Ky. 960; Butler v. Cabe, 116 Ark. 26, 28-29. …automobiles are lawful vehicles and have equal rights on the highways with horses and carriages. Daily v. Maxwell, 133 S.W. 351, 354.
Matson v. Dawson, 178 N.W. 2d 588, 591. A farmer has the same right to the use of the highways of the state, whether on foot or in a motor vehicle, as any other citizen.
Draffin v. Massey, 92 S.E.2d 38, 42. Persons may lawfully ride in automobiles, as they may lawfully ride on bicycles. Doherty v. Ayer, 83 N.E. 677, 197 Mass. 241, 246;
Molway v. City of Chicago, 88 N.E. 485, 486, 239 Ill. 486; Smiley v. East St. Louis Ry. Co., 100 N.E. 157, 158. “A soldier’s personal automobile is part of his ‘household goods[.]’
U.S. v Bomar, C.A.5(Tex.), 8 F.3d 226, 235” 19A Words and Phrases – Permanent Edition (West) pocket part 94. “[I]t is a jury question whether … an automobile … is a motor vehicle[.]”
United States v Johnson, 718 F.2d 1317, 1324 (5th Cir. 1983). Other right to use an automobile cases: –
EDWARDS VS. CALIFORNIA, 314 U.S. 160 –
TWINING VS NEW JERSEY, 211 U.S. 78 – WILLIAMS VS. FEARS, 179 U.S. 270, AT 274 – CRANDALL VS. NEVADA, 6 WALL. 35, AT 43-44 – THE PASSENGER CASES, 7 HOWARD 287, AT 492 – U.S. VS. GUEST, 383 U.S. 745, AT 757-758 (1966) –
GRIFFIN VS. BRECKENRIDGE, 403 U.S. 88, AT 105-106 (1971) – CALIFANO VS. TORRES, 435 U.S. 1, AT 4, note 6 –
SHAPIRO VS. THOMPSON, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) – CALIFANO VS. AZNAVORIAN, 439 U.S. 170, AT 176 (1978) Look the above citations up in American Jurisprudence. Some citations may be paraphrased.

http://wearechange.org/u-s-supreme-court-says-no-license-necessary-to-drive-automobile-on-public-highwaysstreets/

 
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Posted by on September 18, 2015 in Investigations

 

CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect Bad Debts > Newsroom > Consumer Financial Protection Bureau

CFPB TAKES ACTION AGAINST THE TWO LARGEST DEBT BUYERS FOR USING DECEPTIVE TACTICS TO COLLECT BAD DEBTS
SEP 9 2015
CFPB Takes Action Against the Two Largest Debt Buyers for Using Deceptive Tactics to Collect Bad Debts
Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates Must Refund Millions of Dollars and Overhaul Debt Collection and Litigation Practices

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Today the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) took action against the nation’s two largest debt buyers and collectors for using deceptive tactics to collect bad debts. The Bureau found that Encore Capital Group and Portfolio Recovery Associates bought debts that were potentially inaccurate, lacking documentation, or unenforceable. Without verifying the debt, the companies collected payments by pressuring consumers with false statements and churning out lawsuits using robo-signed court documents. The CFPB has ordered the companies to overhaul their debt collection and litigation practices and to stop reselling debts to third parties. Encore must pay up to $42 million in consumer refunds and a $10 million penalty, and stop collection on over $125 million worth of debts. Portfolio Recovery Associates must pay $19 million in consumer refunds and an $8 million penalty, and stop collecting on over $3 million worth of debts.

“Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates threatened and deceived consumers to collect on debts they should have known were inaccurate or had other problems,” said CFPB Director Richard Cordray. “Now, the two biggest debt buyers in the market must refund millions and overhaul their practices. We will continue to take action to protect consumers from illegal and obnoxious debt collection practices.”

Encore Capital Group, Inc. is headquartered in San Diego, Calif. Its subsidiaries also named in today’s action are Midland Funding LLC, Midland Credit Management, and Asset Acceptance Capital Corp. Together, they form the nation’s largest debt buyer and collector. Portfolio Recovery Associates is the nation’s second largest debt buyer and collector. Portfolio Recovery Associates is a Delaware for-profit corporation headquartered in Norfolk, Va. and is a wholly-owned subsidiary of PRA Group, Inc.

As debt buyers, Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates purchase delinquent or charged-off accounts for a fraction of the value of the debt. Although they pay only pennies on the dollar for the debt, they may attempt to collect the full amount claimed by the original lender. Together, these two companies have purchased the rights to collect over $200 billion in defaulted consumer debts on credit cards, phone bills, and other accounts.

The CFPB found that Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates attempted to collect debts that they knew, or should have known, were inaccurate or could not legally be enforced based on contractual disclaimers, past practices of debt sellers, or consumer disputes. The companies also filed lawsuits against consumers without having the intent to prove many of the debts, winning the vast majority of the lawsuits by default when consumers failed to defend themselves. These practices violated the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.

Collecting Bad Debts
Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates illegally attempted to collect debt that they knew, or should have known, may have been inaccurate or unenforceable. Specifically, the CFPB found that the companies:

Attempted to collect on unsubstantiated or inaccurate debt: Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates stated incorrect balances, interest rates, and payment due dates in attempting to collect debts from consumers. The companies purchased large portfolios of consumer debt with balances that sellers claimed were “approximate” or that otherwise did not reflect the correct amount owed by the consumer. Sellers also warned the companies that some of the debts they were buying may not have the most recent consumer payments deducted from the balance. Some sellers also represented that documents were not available for some of the accounts. The companies continued purchasing from these sellers and then collecting on that debt without first conducting any investigation to determine whether the debts were accurate and enforceable.
Illegal Litigation Practices
Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates collected debts through lawsuits and threats of legal action in unlawful ways. Specifically, the companies:

Misrepresented their intention to prove debts they sued consumers over: Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates regularly attempted to collect on debts by suing consumers in state courts across the country. In numerous cases, the companies had no intention of proving these debts. They placed tens of thousands of debts with law firms staffed by only a handful of attorneys and in many cases made no effort to obtain the documents to back up their claims. Instead, the companies relied on consumers not filing a defense and winning the lawsuits by default.
Relied on misleading, robo-signed court filings to churn out lawsuits: Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates filed affidavits that contained misleading statements in debt collection lawsuits across the country. For example, they both used affidavits that misrepresented that the affiants had reviewed original account-level documentation confirming the consumers’ debts when they had not. The companies also submitted affidavits with documents attached that they claimed were the consumers’ specific account contracts or records when they weren’t. These shortcuts allowed the companies to churn through lawsuits without doing the research and due diligence required to obtain a legitimate judgment.
Sued or threatened to sue consumers past the statute of limitations: From at least July 21, 2011 to March 31, 2013, Encore sent thousands of letters offering a time-limited opportunity to “settle” without revealing that the debt was too old for litigation. From January 2009 to March 2012, Portfolio Recovery Associates sent similar letters to consumers. Both of the companies also filed cases past the applicable statute of limitations.
Pressured consumers to make payments using misrepresentations: Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates made other inaccurate statements to consumers to press them to make additional payments. Specifically:
Encore falsely told consumers the burden of proof was on them to disprove the debt: In sworn affidavits, Encore falsely told consumers and courts that the debt should be assumed to be valid because the consumer had not disputed it within a certain time period. In fact, Encore had the burden to first prove the debt was owed and accurate before the consumer had to challenge it.
Portfolio Recovery Associates falsely claimed an attorney had reviewed the file and a lawsuit was imminent: The company’s collectors, who identified themselves as from the “Litigation Department,” misrepresented to consumers that litigation against them was planned, imminent, or even underway. In reality, in many cases, an attorney had not reviewed the account and the company had not decided whether to file suit.
Other Illegal Collection Practices
Encore disregarded or failed to adequately investigate consumers’ disputes: If a consumer disputed their debt more than 45 days after Encore started collecting, Encore would require the consumer to produce specific documents or other “proof” to support their dispute or it would not conduct the legally-required investigation of the issues raised by the consumer.
Encore farmed out disputed debts to law firms without forwarding required information: In numerous instances, Encore assigned disputed debt to law firms and third-party debt collectors without informing them that the debt was disputed. As a result, law firms evaluating Encore accounts for litigation did not know which accounts were disputed.
Encore made harassing collection calls to consumers: Encore called consumers repeatedly or continuously with the intent to annoy, abuse, or harass them into paying. Encore’s subsidiary, Asset Acceptance, made thousands of calls to consumers before 8 a.m. or after 9 p.m. and called hundreds of consumers more than 20 times in a two-day period.
Portfolio Recovery Associates misled consumers into consenting to receive auto-dialed cell phone calls: For approximately a year, and ending in August 2013, Portfolio Recovery Associates told consumers that they could only prevent collection calls to their cell phones before 9 a.m. if they consented to receive calls on their cell phones from a dialer. The company penalized representatives who failed to adhere to this policy.
Enforcement Action
Pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Act, the CFPB has the authority to take action against institutions or individuals engaging in unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or practices or that otherwise violate federal consumer financial laws. Under the terms of the CFPB orders released today, Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates are required to:

Stop reselling debts: The companies are prohibited from reselling the debts they buy to other debt collectors. This will protect consumers from the potential harm that results when debt collectors continue to sell and resell debts that may be inaccurate or lack the business records and information needed to collect them.
Refund millions of dollars to consumers:
Encore must pay up to $42 million in refunds: The company must provide refunds where it collected payments by misrepresenting that it could sue on a time-barred debt or by misrepresenting in court that a debt was assumed valid because the consumer did not previously dispute it.
Portfolio Recovery Associates must pay $19 million in refunds: The company must provide refunds where it collected payments by misrepresenting that an attorney had reviewed a debt or that collectors were calling on behalf of attorneys, and where it collected payments on judgments that it should not have obtained because they were barred by the statute of limitations from suing to collect the debt.
Cease collections on millions of dollars of debt:
Encore must stop collecting on $125 million of debt: The company must release or move to vacate all judgments and dismiss all lawsuits where it misrepresented that a debt was assumed valid, and stop any attempts to enforce or collect on these judgments. The face value of this debt is estimated at over $125 million.
Portfolio Recovery Associates must stop collecting on $3 million of debt: The company must release or move to vacate all judgments and dismiss all pending lawsuits it filed past the statute of limitations and stop any attempts to enforce or collect on those judgments, estimated to have a face value of $3.4 million.
Stop collecting debts they can’t verify: Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates can’t collect unsubstantiated debt. Under the order, they must review original account-level documents verifying a debt before collecting on it when, for example, a consumer has disputed it, the seller didn’t promise it was accurate or valid, or the debt was part of a portfolio they knew included unsupportable or inaccurate information.
Ensure accuracy when filing lawsuits: The companies cannot file lawsuits to enforce debts unless they have specific documents and information showing the debt is accurate and enforceable.
Provide consumers information before filing suit: Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates must provide consumers with information about a debt, such as the name of the creditor and charge-off balance, and offer to provide consumers with original documents relating to the account before they are allowed to file a lawsuit or threaten to file suit to collect the debt.
Use accurate affidavits: The companies cannot use affidavits to collect debts unless the statements contained in the affidavits specifically and accurately describe the signer’s knowledge of the facts and the documents attached.
Reform collection of older debts: Encore and Portfolio Recovery Associates are prohibited from suing or threatening to sue to collect on time-barred debt. They also cannot collect on such debt unless they disclose to consumers that they can’t sue to collect it.
Pay civil money penalties:
Encore must pay a penalty of $10 million to the CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund.
Portfolio Recovery Associates must pay a penalty of $8 million to the CFPB’s Civil Penalty Fund.
The Encore consent order can be found at: http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_consent-order-encore-capital-group.pdf

The Portfolio Recovery Associates consent order can be found at: http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201509_cfpb_consent-order-portfolio-recovery-associates-llc.pdf

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The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau is a 21st century agency that helps consumer finance markets work by making rules more effective, by consistently and fairly enforcing those rules, and by empowering consumers to take more control over their economic lives. For more information, visit consumerfinance.gov.

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Posted by on September 10, 2015 in Investigations

 

Our 2015 trip to Colorado & Wyoming, Cell Phone Pictures

Yellowstone
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Estes Park, Colorado
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Teton Village, Wyoming
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Wyoming
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Jan & I, National Monument, Colorado
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Janet Kellerman, Oakville, MO, High School Principal & Private Detective
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Royal Gorge, Colorado
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Royal Gorge, Colorado
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Debbie & Steve Glenn, Denver, Colorado
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Royal Gorge, Raptor Club
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Pike’s Peak, Colorado
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Somewhere in Colorado
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Posted by on September 9, 2015 in Investigations

 
 
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